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1 Introduction
According to standard job search theory, more generous unemployment
benefits increase the unemployment rate by reducing the search effort of
workers thereby reducing the unemployment outflow rate. This prediction has
been studied extensively in theoretical and empirical work and has proved to
be empirically relevant and quantitatively important. The general finding from
the empirical literature which will be discussed in more detail below is that it
takes about 14 weeks of benefit duration to increase unemployment duration
by one week.
The benefit system may affect unemployment not only via a reduced outflow
from unemployment but also via a higher inflow into unemployment. One
prominent argument, due to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), holds that idio-
syncratic shocks to workers’ productivities let firms’ optimal layoff rule depend
on the wage rate—which in turn is affected by the prevailing unemployment
benefit system. If the benefit system becomes more generous newly established
jobs become unprofitable more quickly. As a result, a more generous benefit
system will lead to an increase in the steady state flow from employment to
unemployment. Alternatively, when workers’ preferences (rather than their
productivity) change randomly over time, a sufficiently negative shock may
induce an employed worker to “quit” and collect benefits. More generous
benefits will induce individuals to quit more easily raising the inflow into
unemployment. As we discuss below, and in contrast to outflow effects,
empirical evidence on the effects of benefit generosity on the unemployment
inflow is much more scarce and far from conclusive.
The aim of this paper is to assess how the potential duration of unemploy-
ment benefits affects the equilibrium unemployment rate. Our main contri-
bution is the analysis of the joint effects of benefit duration on the outflow
from and the inflow into unemployment. This is different from the literature
which has studied one of the two effects in isolation. The majority of previous
studies has concentrated on the effects of the generosity of the benefit system
on the probability that unemployed workers find regular jobs while a smaller
literature has looked on the role of benefit rules on the probability to enter
unemployment.
Understanding the inflow and outflow effects of the unemployment benefit
system is crucial for labor market policy. First, the overall effect of a policy
change remains unclear without a comprehensive understanding of both the
inflow and the outflow channel. The risk is that policy makers may under-
estimate the implications of extended benefits for steady state labor market
outcomes. Second, it is also crucial to understand the relative importance of the
inflow and the outflow channel from a welfare point of view. Generous benefits
that prolong unemployment spells can be problematic because long-term un-
employment can cause skill depreciation. Skill depreciation is less of a concern
when generous benefits mainly reduce job duration. As previous studies were
typically concerned either with the inflow effect or with the outflow effect,
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the relative size of these two effects remains unclear. The current study aims
to shed light on their relative importance. As far as we know, this is the first
paper that investigates the implications of the unemployment benefit system
from a comprehensive perspective.1
Our analysis is based on a change in the Austrian unemployment insurance
system that lead to a quasi-experimental situation allowing us to estimate
benefit-duration effects on flows in and out of unemployment. In August 1989,
the Austrian government made unemployment insurance more generous by
increasing the maximum duration of unemployment benefits for certain groups
of workers. Depending on age and previous work experience, the potential
duration of regular benefits was raised from 30 to 52 weeks for one group, from
30 to 39 for a second group, and remained unchanged for a further group. We
exploit this policy change and its differential treatment of these various groups
of workers to assess the impact of benefit duration on unemployment inflows
and outflows.
A particular advantage of our analysis is a very large and informative
data set drawn from two sources: the Austrian unemployment register and
the Austrian Social Security Data (ASSD). These data sources contain the
universe of all employed and unemployed Austrian workers. We observe these
worker over a period of four years, two years before the policy change, i.e.
from August 1987 to July 1989; and two years after this policy change, from
August 1989 to July 1991. A further advantage of our study concerns the fact
that the period during which the policy change took place was quite stable
from a macroeconomic perspective. This implies that our study is not subject
to endogenous policy bias which arises when more generous unemployment in-
surance rules are implemented in anticipation of a deteriorating labor market.
Such a policy bias has been found important in several recent studies (Card and
Levine 2000; Lalive and Zweimüller 2004a). The absence of an endogenous
policy bias, the large size and the low measurement error in our data set allow
us to estimate the relevant policy parameters quite precisely.
Although we study both inflow and outflow effects of extended unemploy-
ment benefits the novelty of our paper is in the inflow analysis and above
all in the comprehensive perspective. In previous work we analyzed outflow
effects of the Austrian benefit system in detail. In Lalive et al. (2006) we
show that the duration of unemployment is affected by two key parameters
of unemployment insurance, the benefit replacement rate and the potential
benefit duration. While the current study also addresses benefit duration
effects, the overlap is limited. It is restricted to the relationship between
1There are cross-country studies that relate aggregate parameters of the unemployment insurance
system—i.e. average replacement rate and average benefit duration—and other labor market
institutions in various countries to the aggregate unemployment rates in these countries. See for
an overview Layard and Nickell (1999).
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potential benefit duration and outflow from unemployment.2 In Lalive et al.
(2006) we analyze the joint effect of potential benefit duration and changes in
the replacement ratio. (In the present analysis we focus only on those workers
for whom the replacement ratio remained unchanged). Moreover, the analysis
is based on a more sophisticated methodology, a proportional hazard approach
that allows us to investigate in detail the effect of observables on the exit
rate from unemployment and the evolution of the exit rate over the elapsed
duration. Because here we follow a more comprehensive approach in which
we want to analyze inflow to and outflow from unemployment in a similar
way we do not analyze the outflow processes in as much detail. In fact, as
discussed in more detail below, we use straightforward logit analysis focusing
on the probability to leave unemployment within a particular interval. The
logit analysis is not as rich as the proportional hazard analysis but by and large
generates similar results in terms of the way the extended potential benefit
duration influence the overall outflow from unemployment. By performing
a similar logit analysis for the probability to lose a job within a particular
calendar time interval, we are able to capture equilibrium unemployment as
derived from dynamics concerning both inflow and outflow.
Our findings with respect to the effect of the potential benefit duration
(PBD) on the outflow from unemployment are in line with Lalive et al. (2006).
The increase in PBD reduces the outflow a lot. The novel findings are twofold.
First, the extension of the PBD also increases the inflow into unemployment.
Our second finding is that the effect on the equilibrium unemployment rate
due to increase in the inflow into unemployment is more important than
the effect due to the decrease in the outflow from unemployment. Although
the PBD extension makes it only a little bit more attractive for employed
workers to become unemployed, there are many more employed workers than
unemployed workers. This difference in the size of the two groups of workers
causes the inflow effect to be larger.
The set-up of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant the-
oretical and empirical literature. Section 3 discusses the characteristics of the
Austrian unemployment insurance system and briefly describes the Austrian
labor market during the period when the change in maximum unemployment
benefits was implemented. Section 4 presents the data we use in our analysis
and discusses our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents parameter estimates
2Note that Lalive and Zweimüller (2004a, b) also use Austrian data to analyze how unemployment
benefits affect the outflow from unemployment but these studies are based on information from
Austrian regions with a dominant steel industry. In these regions, in 1988 an extended benefit
program was introduced for workers aged 50 or older. The focus of both studies is on policy
endogeneity, which indeed turns out to introduce a substantial bias in the parameter estimates.
In Lalive et al. (2006) and the current paper to avoid policy endogeneity problems the analysis
excludes the steel dominated regions.
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and Section 6 uses our estimates to simulate the implied effects for the steady-
state unemployment rate. Section 7 concludes.
2 How potential benefit duration affects unemployment
2.1 Theory
Denote by θu,t(x|T) the probability that an unemployed worker with personal
characteristics x finds a job in calendar time interval t when T is the maximum
benefit duration (or potential benefit duration—PBD); and by θe,t(x|T) the
probability that an employed worker with these characteristics loses his/her job
in calendar time interval t. The steady state unemployment rate of the group
of workers with characteristics x is then
u∗(x|T) = θe(x|T)
θe(x|T) + θu(x|T) . (1)
Consider the effects of a change in the maximum benefit duration T from
the perspective of search theory. According to Mortensen (1977) expanding
the duration of benefits has two opposite effects on the exit rate out of
unemployment. First, the value of being unemployed increases so there is a
disincentive effect that leads an unemployed worker to search less intensively.
Second, the value of being employed also increases (because the value of being
unemployed in the future has increased) which has a positive effect on the
exit rate. For short-term unemployed the disincentive effect dominates, for
unemployed near the point of benefit exhaustion (and beyond) the incentive
effect dominates. Therefore, if there is an extension of benefit duration this
will have a negative effect on the exit rate out of unemployment for short-term
unemployed but it will have a positive effect on the exit rate for long-term
unemployed. While the first effect has been found often in empirical research,
evidence for the second effect is scarce (Fredriksson and Holmlund 2006).
The increase in the value of being unemployed through the extension of the
potential benefit duration may also induce an increase in the inflow into unem-
ployment. There are various reasons why this could be the case. For instance,
the standard search and matching model with endogenous job destruction
(Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, and Pissarides 2000, chapter 2) assumes that
a worker’s productivity on the job is subject to idiosyncratic shocks and firms
require a minimum productivity level that prevents them from firing the
worker and destroying the job. The firms’ reservation productivity increases
with more generous unemployment benefits, because more generous benefits
push up wages requiring a higher average productivity on the job. Alterna-
tively, assume a worker’s disutility of labor (rather than his/her productivity)
is subject to idiosyncratic shocks. In that case, more generous benefits will
induce a worker to quit his/her job more easily. More generous unemployment
benefits may also increase the take-up of unemployment benefits. Conditional
on losing his/her job, a worker may be more inclined to apply for benefits.
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Finally, it may be that the separation rate increases because a worker reduces
his/her effort on the job and is more likely to be dismissed because he/she is
less likely to take actions to prevent job loss.3
In conclusion, from a theoretical point of view, it is likely that
∂θu(x|T)/∂T < 0 and ∂θe(x|T)/∂T > 0. Therefore, an extension of the maxi-
mum benefit duration will increase the equilibrium unemployment rate:
∂u∗(x|T)
∂T
> 0. (2)
2.2 Empirical literature
Several US studies estimate the effects on the unemployment exit rate of
variations in PBD that take place during recessions.4 Early studies, including
Moffitt and Nicholson (1982), Moffitt (1985), and Grossman (1989) find sig-
nificantly negative incentive effects. Meyer (1990) and Katz and Meyer (1990)
show that the exit rate from unemployment rises sharply just before benefits
are exhausted. Such spikes are absent for nonrecipients. More recent work by
Addison and Portugal (2004) confirms these findings.5
A common objection against these studies is policy endogeneity. Benefits
are typically extended in anticipation of a worse labor market for the eligible
workers. Card and Levine (2000) exploit a variation in benefit duration in New
Jersey that occurred independently of labor market condition and show that
policy bias is substantial. Lalive and Zweimüller (2004b) find similar evidence
for Austria.
Evidence on the effect of PBD in European studies is mixed. Hunt (1995)
finds substantial disincentive effects of extended benefit entitlement periods
for Germany. Carling et al. (1996) find a big increase in the outflow from
unemployment to labor market programs whereas the increase in the exit
rate to employment is substantially smaller. Puhani (2000) finds that reduc-
tions in PBD in Poland did not have a significant effect on the duration
of unemployment whereas Adamchik (1999) finds a strong increase in re-
employment probabilities around benefit expiration. Roed and Zhang (2003)
find for Norwegian unemployed that the exit rate out of unemployment
increases sharply in the months just prior to benefit exhaustion where the
effect is larger for females than for males. Winter-Ebmer (1998) and Lalive
3Note, however, that according to Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) there is not much empirical
evidence in support of such an effect.
4Fredriksson and Holmlund (2003) give a recent overview of empirical research related to
incentives in unemployment insurance. See Green and Riddell (1997), and Ham and Rea (1987)
for studies that focus on Canada.
5Note that there is no theoretical explanation for the existence of end-of-benefit spikes. It could
be that the spikes have to do with strategic timing of the job starting date, i.e. workers have already
found a job but they postpone starting to work until their benefits are close to expiration. Card and
Levine (2000) point at the possibility that there is an implicit contract between the unemployed
worker and his previous employer to be rehired just before benefit expire.
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and Zweimüller (2004b) show that extending the potential duration of benefits
had significant disincentive effects in Austria. Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006)
studying PBD reductions in Slovenia find both strong effects on the exit rate
out of unemployment and substantial spikes around benefit exhaustion.
Empirical studies on the unemployment inflow effect of a lengthening of
the maximum benefit duration are more rare. Most of these studies focus on
requirements concerning entrance into unemployment insurance. Christofides
and McKenna (1995, 1996) for example find a clear relationship between
entrance requirements of Canadian unemployment insurance and employment
durations. The exit rate from employment to unemployment increases sub-
stantially as soon as the workers satisfy the number of weeks worked in order
to qualify for UI benefits. Anderson and Meyer (1997) investigate the take
up rate of unemployment benefit insurance of workers separating from their
employer. They find that both the level and the maximum duration of benefits
have a significant positive effect. Green and Riddell (1997) study the effect
of changes in entrance requirements on the inflow into Canadian unemploy-
ment finding that changes in these requirements have a significant impact on
employment durations. They also find that many employment spells that just
qualify under the old system are extended to just qualify under the new system.
And they find that all of the response is in layoffs, not quits, which suggests that
employers play an important role in the adjustment of employment durations.
Green and Sargent (1998) analyze Canadian data and also find evidence of
concentrations of job spell durations at the entrance requirement point and at
the point at which individuals have qualified for the maximum possible weeks
of benefit receipts. Winter-Ebmer (2003) finds strong inflow effects of the
Austrian regional extended benefit program which granted very long benefits
for older workers in certain regions.6 These results are in line with those of
Lalive and Zweimüller (2004a) who also find significant inflow effects which
were particularly strong immediately before this program was abolished.
3 Institutional background
Like in a number of other countries the Austrian unemployment insurance
system is characterized by a limited period over which unemployed individuals
can draw ‘regular’ unemployment benefits. Unemployment benefits depend
on previous earnings and, compared to other European countries, the re-
placement ratio (benefits relative to gross monthly earnings) is rather low.
In 1990, the replacement ratio was 40.4% for the median income earner;
48.2% for a low-wage worker who earned half the median; and 29.6% for
a high-wage worker earning twice the median. On top, family allowances
6The regional extended benefit program was implemented in 1987 and ended in 1993 and was
directed to a subset of Austrian regions. (See Winter-Ebmer 1998, 2003 and Lalive and Zweimüller
2004a, b). The policy change analyzed here applies to workers in all other regions and excludes
regions that were subject to the regional extended benefit program.
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are paid. Unemployment benefit payments are not taxed and not means-
tested. Voluntary quitters and workers discharged for misconduct cannot claim
benefits until a waiting period of 4 weeks has passed. Unemployment benefit
recipients are expected to search actively for a new job that should be within
the scope of the claimant’s qualifications, at least during the first months of
the unemployment spell. Non-compliance with the eligibility rules is subject to
benefit sanctions that can lead to the withdrawal of benefits for up to 4 weeks.
Once the period of regular unemployment benefits has expired, individuals
can apply for “transfer payments for those in need”.7 As the name indicates,
these transfers are means-tested and the job seeker is considered eligible only
if she or he is in trouble. These payments depend on the income and wealth
situation of other family members and close relatives and may, in principle, last
for an indefinite time period. These transfers are granted for successive periods
of 39 weeks after which eligibility requirements are recurrently checked. The
post-unemployment benefits transfers are lower than unemployment benefits
and can at most be 92% of unemployment benefits. In 1990, the median post-
unemployment benefits transfer payment was about 70% of the median unem-
ployment benefits. Note, however, that individuals who are eligible for such
transfers may not be comparable to individuals who collect unemployment
benefits because not all individuals who exhaust unemployment benefits pass
the means test. The majority of the unemployed (59%) received unemploy-
ment benefits, whereas 26% received post-unemployment benefit transfers. In
sum, the Austrian unemployment insurance system is less generous than many
other continental European systems and closer to the U.S. system.8
Before August 1989, an unemployed person could draw regular unemploy-
ment benefits for a maximum period of 30 weeks provided that he or she had
paid unemployment insurance contributions for at least 156 weeks within the
last 5 years.9 In August 1989 the potential duration of unemployment benefit
payments became dependent not only on previous experience but also on
age at the beginning of the unemployment spell. Benefit duration for the age
group 40–49 was increased to 39 weeks if the unemployed had 312 weeks of
employment within the last 10 years prior to the current spell. For the age
group 50 and older, unemployment benefit duration was increased to 52 weeks
if the unemployed had been employed for at least 468 weeks within the last
15 years. Austrian policy makers introduced age delineation for two reasons.
First, as age is the strongest predictor of long-term unemployment, policy
7This so-called “Notstandshilfe” implies that job seekers who do not meet benefit eligibility
criteria can apply at the beginning of their spell.
8See Nickell and Layard (1999). It is interesting to note that the incidence of long-term unemploy-
ment in Austria is closer to U.S. figures than to those of other European countries. In 1995, when
our sample period ends, 17.4% of the unemployment stock were spells with an elapsed duration
of 12 months or more. This compares to 9.7% for the U.S. and to 45.6% for France, 48.3% for
Germany, and 62.7% for Italy (OECD 1999).
9UB duration was 20 weeks for job-seekers who did not meet this requirement. This paper focuses
on individuals who were entitled to at least 30 weeks of benefits.
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makers wanted to improve protection for older workers by granting payment
of regular unemployment benefits for a longer time period. Second, about
one year prior to the August 1989 policy change, the Krisenregionsregelung
introduced very strong age delineation at age 50 years. Age delineation was
therefore adopted in August 1989 to be consistent with earlier modification of
unemployment benefit rules.
4 Data and empirical strategy
To assess the impact of increasing benefit duration on unemployment outflow
and inflow rates, we use longitudinal individual data from two different
sources: (i) the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD), which contains de-
tailed information on the individuals’ employment, unemployment and earn-
ings history since the year 1972, and some information on the employer, like
region and industry affiliation; and (ii) the Austrian unemployment register,
from which we get information on the relevant socioeconomic characteristics.
From these data we drew two samples, a “before-policy” sample and an
“after-policy” sample, as follows. The sample was constructed such that all
individuals fulfill the experience requirement required for extended eligibility
and that control individuals not too different in age from the treatment group.
Thus, for both samples we selected individuals who were at least 35 years
and at most 54 years old. Furthermore, we included only individuals with a
continuous work history. To be included in the sample, an individual had to
have a job for at least 6 out of the last 10 years and for at least 9 out of the
last 15 years. Hence all individuals in our sample satisfy the work experience
criteria for eligibility to extended benefit duration (see above). Our additional
sample restrictions were motivated by concerns with events that may confound
the estimates of the effects of PBD on inflow and outflow. We excluded all
individuals living in regions subject to the regional extended benefit program
because these regions were covered by different extended benefit rules for
workers older than 50 years.10 Furthermore, we considered only workers with
previous income above Austrian Shilling 12,610 (Euros 916) because workers
below this threshold experienced an increase in benefits levels in 1989 a policy
change that is beyond the scope of this paper. The sample also excludes
workers previously employe in the construction and tourism industries as
unemployment durations in these groups are mainly driven by seasonal factors.
To make the sample as clean as possible we concentrate our analysis on “at-
tached workers”, i.e. workers who are either employed or unemployed during
the first observation year. The reason is that our focus is on flows between
employment and unemployment rather than on flow between employment
10This so-called Krisenregionsregelung applied to about 15% of all observations. In these crises-
ridden regions even more generous unemployed insurance policies were implemented between
1988 and 1993. For empirical analyzes of these programs, see Winter-Ebmer (1998, 2003) and
Lalive and Zweimüller (2004a, b).
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(unemployment) and out-of-labor force. While this is potentially interesting
our data set is not informative whether individuals have access to programs
other than unemployment insurance in case they drop out of the work force.
Concentrating on attached workers has the advantage that flows in and out
of non-employment are less important. Our empirical analysis is based on a
comparison of two samples. The “before-policy” sample contains individuals
who were either (i) employed as white or blue collar workers or who were
(ii) unemployed at one of the four mid-quarter baseline dates (10th February,
10th May, 10th August, 10th October) in the year 1986. We then follow these
individuals up until quarter IV.1988. The “after-policy” sample contains all
individuals who were either unemployed or employed as blue- or white-collar
workers at each mid-quarter baseline date in the year 1990. We then follow
these individuals up until quarter IV.1992. Note that this design allows individ-
uals in the before-policy (after-policy) sample to be out of labor force only in
the years 1987 and 1988 (1991 and 1992). Hence this restriction reinforces our
focus on attached workers whose unemployment rates are below the actual
unemployment rates which include workers with some distance from the labor
market. Note further, that we do not consider observations for the year 1989.
This procedure minimizes potential biases resulting from anticipation effects
that may arise due to behavioral changes of individuals that were unemployed
under initial policy rules but were anticipating that rules will become more
generous.
Table 1 compares the characteristics of the two groups. There are basically
two major differences between the two groups. First, we see that after the
policy change, somewhat more than a quarter (half) of the sample is eligible
to additional 22 (9) weeks of potential benefits duration. While average age in
the before-policy sample is only slightly younger (by 0.4 years) than the after-
policy sample, the distribution across relevant age groups is more strongly
affected. Second, we see that the after-policy sample has a higher fraction of
females.11 Otherwise, the differences between samples are minor. Real earn-
ings are slightly higher in the after-policy sample. Years of work experience
within the last 15 years (“Experience”) and the duration of the current job
(“Tenure”; for the non-employed: tenure in the last job) is slightly higher in
the after policy sample. Moreover, the number of white collar workers and the
industry distributions of the two samples are very similar.
Our analysis of the impact of the maximum duration of benefits on the
steady-state unemployment rate is based on an analysis of individual transition
probabilities to and from unemployment. To assess the effect of the maximum
11The higher fraction of ages 50+ is because the big birth cohorts of 1940–1942 are in the age
group 40–49 in the before-policy sample whereas they are in the age group 50+ in the after-policy
sample. The higher fraction of females in the after-policy sample is most likely due to the fact that
the cohorts that are in the after-policy but not in the before-policy sample have a high labor force
participation and are relatively large (vintages in the mid 1950s). In contrast, the cohorts that are
in the before-policy sample but not in the after-policy sample (vintages of the early 1930s) do have
a low labor force participation and are comparably small.
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benefit duration on these transition probabilities we use a simple difference-
in-differences estimator in the context of a logit model for quarterly transition
probabilities for observation i in quarter t
θ∗yit = δy1 ELIG52it + δy2 ELIG39it + γy Ait + xitβy + εyit (3)
θ∗yit ≥ 0 if θyit = 1 and θ∗yit < 0 if θyit = 0
where y is a subscript indicating whether the transition concerns outflow from
unemployment (y = u) or inflow into unemployment (y = e). The variables
ELIG52it and ELIG39it are indicator variables that take value 1 when obser-
vation i is eligible for at most 52 or at most 39 benefit weeks, respectively.12
Furthermore, δy1 and δy2 are the corresponding differences-in-differences
estimators, the dummy variable Ait indicates the after-policy period and γy
measures the calender time effect on transition y that is irrespective of obser-
vation i’s eligibility status. Finally, xit is a vector in individual characteristics,
βy is a vector of parameters that estimate the impact of these characteristics on
transition y,13 and the error term εyit, capturing unobservable heterogeneity,
are assumed to be standard normally distributed.14
Obviously, whether the difference-in-differences estimator identifies the
causal effect of the increase in benefit duration on the unemployment risk
hinges upon whether or not the policy change was exogenous.15 There are
two reasons why policy endogeneity is most likely of minor importance in the
present context. The first reason is that the economy was doing badly before
the policy change (in the years 1987 and 1988). After the policy change (in the
years 1989, 1990, 1991) the economy was in a boom. To the extent that all age
groups were benefitting from this situation, policy endogeneity is not an issue.
Second, one reason for the implementation of the policy may have been equity
concerns. In 1988, the Austrian government implemented a very generous
program that was targeted towards older steel workers in crises ridden steel
regions. This ‘Austrian regional extended benefit program’ granted 4 years of
unemployment benefits to eligible older workers in crisis-ridden steel regions.
Hence political pressure to treat older unemployed workers in non-eligible
regions more generously was one reason for changing the benefit rules. To
the extent that such equity concerns were the reason for the policy change, the
increase in benefit duration can be regarded as exogenous with respect to labor
market outcomes of the eligible individuals in our sample.
12All observations in our samples for which both T39i = 0 and T52i = 0 are eligible for at most 30
weeks of benefits.
13The vector of individual characteristics includes the individual’s age, age dummies, dummies for
the inflow quarter, log daily wage, experience, tenure, broad occupation (blue/white collar), sex,
and industry (manufacturing, construction/tourism, other industries).
14The analysis below will be undertaken also for more flexible specifications of age and calendar
time, and will be estimated for various subgroups to assess the robustness of the results.
15If policy was implemented because policy makers became concerned with worse labor market
prospects for older individuals there would be policy endogeneity.
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An important assumption of the diff-in-diff strategy is that there are no
differential trends in unemployment between treated and control groups. In
our analysis below we will use the age group 35–39 as the benchmark for
changes in unemployment inflows and outflows in the absence of the PBD
extension. To check whether this age group is a good benchmark for the
changes in unemployment Fig. 1 provides information on trends in unemploy-
ment during the pre-reform period. Note that Fig. 1 is based on the official
unemployment rate thus covering both attached workers (as our sample does)
as well as unattached workers leading to higher unemployment rates than in
our sample. As Fig. 1 shows clearly that the unemployment rates of the age
groups 35–39, 40–49 and 50–54 are similar and do not show any substantial
differences in the trend over the pre-reform period.
Our analysis concentrates on the period 1987–1992. In 1987 the economy
was at the end of a recession and started to improve. Real GDP growth was
1.7% in 1987 and then started to grow to as much as 4.7% in 1990. The
favorable situation of the business cycle led to strong employment growth
throughout the period under consideration. The unemployment rate was
rather stable due to an increase in labor supply (immigration and rising female
labor force participation). Aggregate flows into and out of unemployment did
not dramatically change during the period under consideration. The aggregate
quarterly unemployment inflow rate (new unemployment spells that started in
given quarter relative to the total stock of employment and out-of-labor-force)
was fluctuating around 2.75% and the average duration of unemployment
(spells completed during respective year) was roughly stable at somewhat less
than 4 months. The average unemployment rate during the post-treatment
period 1989–1991 was as high as during the pre-treatment period 1987–1988.
Furthermore, employment growth during the treatment period was even
somewhat stronger than before.
Fig. 1 Pre-reform trends in
unemployment rates, by age
groups
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It is worth noting that the improving labor market is favorable in terms
of our empirical strategy. This is because it is unlikely that comparing labor
market experiences of older workers before and after the policy change are
driven by a deteriorating labor market. Notice, however, that workers aged
35–39 could be affected by business cycle fluctuations in a different way than
older workers aged 40–49 or 50–54 invalidating the assumption of diff-in-diff
analysis. As a crude check whether this concern is relevant we ran separate
OLS regressions with the age-specific unemployment rate as the dependent
variable and the aggregate unemployment rate as a regressor. For all three
age groups, the coefficients are not significantly different from unity and
point estimates are almost identical in these regressions. Hence business-cycle
reactions do not seem to differ strongly across age-groups.
5 Empirical estimates
We proceed in two steps. We first show the regression results of our basic
statistical model for the unemployment flows, separately for the unemploy-
ment outflow and the unemployment inflow. We next check (i) whether our
estimated effects of benefit duration extension are robust to a more flexible
specification of the age and calendar time variables; (ii) how the estimated
effects of benefit duration are robust once the duration of the current state
(elapsed duration of unemployment in the outflow equation; and tenure on the
current job in the inflow equation); and (iii) how the estimated effects differ
across various population subgroups. Using our outflow- and inflow-estimates,
we can then discuss the question of interest: How do the changes in maximum
benefit duration affect the steady-state unemployment rate?
5.1 Unemployment outflow and inflow
Table 2 shows the results of equation (3) both for the unemployment outflow
(columns 1 and 2) and the unemployment inflow (columns 3 and 4). (Notice
that the coefficients displayed in the Table are marginal effects evaluated at
the sample means of the right-hand-side variables). The logit estimation of
column 1 includes all 29,786 unemployment cases observed in one of the eight
quarterly baseline dates. Similarly, the estimation of column 2 is based on the
1,245,337 employment cases observed in our sample.
The diff-in-diff estimators are in line with the theoretical predictions. Eligi-
bility to longer benefits reduces the outflow rate from unemployment (column
1) and increases the inflow probability into unemployment (column 2). All
coefficients have the expected sign. The effect of increasing PBD by 22 weeks
is particularly strong, both in the outflow and in the inflow equation. The effect
of increasing PBD by 9 weeks is weaker and statistically significant only in the
inflow equation.
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Table 2 Logit results on unemployment flows
Dependent variable Unemployment outflow Unemployment inflow
Mean of dep. variable 0.445 0.011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eligible for 52 weeks −0.090 −0.041 0.002 0.003
(4.30)∗∗ (2.43)∗ (4.19)∗∗ (5.77)∗∗
Eligible for 39 weeks −0.024 −0.018 0.001 0.001
(1.22) (1.15) (2.25)∗ (3.78)∗∗
Duration of unemployment (weeks) −0.008
(24.30)∗∗
Tenure (years) −0.001
(74.23)∗∗
After-policy −0.208 −0.141 −0.000 −0.001
(9.23)∗∗ (6.80)∗∗ (0.64) (2.57)∗
(log) wage −0.150 −0.054 −0.008 −0.004
(11.37)∗∗ (5.17)∗∗ (23.60)∗∗ (13.38)∗∗
Experience (years) −0.013 −0.024 −0.003 −0.001
(5.13)∗∗ (12.06)∗∗ (59.81)∗∗ (36.37)∗∗
White collar 0.089 0.044 −0.004 −0.002
(9.63)∗∗ (4.95)∗∗ (16.06)∗∗ (13.16)∗∗
Manufacturing −0.022 −0.016 0.001 0.001
(3.03)∗∗ (2.85)∗∗ (3.36)∗∗ (5.74)∗∗
Women −0.096 −0.084 −0.003 −0.001
(12.59)∗∗ (13.87)∗∗ (16.61)∗∗ (5.07)∗∗
Calendar time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
(for each quarter)
Age dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
(for each year)
Observations 29786 29786 1245337 1245337
Note: Marginal effects, absolute value of robust z statistics in parentheses, clustered at the
individual level
*Significant at 5%; **significant at 1%
The coefficient of column 1 in Table 2 indicates that the probability that an
individual leaves the unemployment register within the next quarter is reduced
by 9 percentage points for individuals that become eligible to a maximum of
52 benefit weeks instead of the 30 weeks before the policy change. Similarly,
the point estimate of the increase from 30 to 39 weeks of maximum benefit
duration indicates a (statistically insignificant) reduction of 2.4 percentage
points. Column 2 in Table 2 checks how these effects change once we control
for the elapsed duration of the individual’s current unemployment spell. It
turns out that the effects still significantly negative when becoming eligible to
52 benefit weeks albeit the estimated impact reduces to 4.1 percentage points
whereas becoming eligible to 39 weeks leads only to a marginal change in the
point estimate.
We find a strong impact of extending the maximum benefit duration on the
unemployment inflow. The effects are not only highly significant, they are also
quantitatively substantial. Column 3 of Table 2 suggests that, as a result of
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an increase in maximum benefit duration from 30 to 52 weeks, the quarterly
inflow rate increases by 0.2 percentage points. While this looks like a small
number we have to keep in mind that the average quarterly unemployment
inflow rate is also a small number which amounts to roughly 1% per quarter.
Taken together, this results in a quantitatively substantial increase in the
inflow rate of 10%. Similarly, the extension of maximum benefit duration
from 30 to 39 weeks, leads to an increase is associated with a 0.1 percentage
point increase or a 10% increase in the unemployment inflow rate. Column 4
includes the duration of the current job (“tenure”) as an additional regressor
in the estimated equation. It turns out that controlling for tenure increases the
estimated point effects for workers who become eligible for 52 benefit weeks
the inflow rate increases by .3 percentage points whereas the estimated effect
for workers with 39 weeks remains roughly constant.16
Table 2 also displays the coefficient for the remaining control variables
included in the regressions. We find that high-wage workers have substan-
tially lower turnover: they do not only have a lower risk of unemployment
but also a lower chance to exit unemployment have also lower chances to
exit unemployment. Similar effects are found with respect to previous work
experience. In contrast, white-collar workers have a higher unemployment
exit rate and a lower unemployment entry rate. Results also show significant
differences between industries with manufacturing workers showing lower
turnover than other industries (mostly services). Finally, we find that women
have significantly worse chances than men to exit unemployment. Further-
more, there are significant gender differences in the risk of unemployment.
To investigate further to which extent the duration in the current state may
have an impact on the above results, Table 3 performs a number of further
robustness checks. The upper and lower panels of this table refer to outflow
and inflow regressions, respectively. For ease of comparison, column 1 in
Table 3 repeats the baseline results obtained in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.
In column 2, we allow for interaction effects of duration with both calendar
time and age dummies. This does not have any major impact on the estimated
benefit duration effects. For individuals eligible to the extension to 52 weeks
we find a slightly larger negative impact on the outflow and a somewhat
lower impact on the unemployment inflow. For individuals eligible to the
extension to 39 weeks, the coefficients remain basically unchanged. In the
last two columns of Table 3 we split the sample into short and long durations
(below and above 15 weeks of elapsed unemployment duration in the outflow
sample; below and above 10 years of tenure in the inflow sample). It turns
16With respect to the effect of PBD on the unemployment outflow, our results are in line with
the estimates in Lalive et al. (2006) who find that the increase in PBD from 30 to 52 weeks lead
to an increase in the expected duration of unemployment of 12.3% and who find a very small
effect of the increase in PBD from 30 to 39 weeks. Our results are also similar to previous estimate
to Winter-Ebmer (2003) who finds substantial effects of PBD on the unemployment inflow for a
different policy change in Austria, which extended PBD for older worker in certain regions.
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Table 3 Splitting the sample by duration of current state, logit estimates
Unemployment outflow Whole Whole Duration Duration
sample sample ≤15w >15w
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eligible for 52 weeks −0.041 −0.055 −0.027 −0.043
(2.43)* (3.27)** (0.85) (3.01)**
Eligible for 39 weeks −0.018 −0.016 −0.027 −0.021
(1.15) (1.03) (0.96) (1.54)
Duration of unemployment (weeks) −0.008 −0.005 0.008 −0.004
(24.30)** (2.95)** (6.31)** (17.28)**
Calendar time dummies (for each quarter) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age dummies (for each year) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction of duration with No Yes No No
age and calendar time dummies
Unemployment inflow Whole Whole Tenure Tenure
sample sample ≤10y >10y
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eligible for 52 weeks 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
(5.77)** (4.66)** (3.31)** (3.39)**
Eligible for 39 weeks 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000
(3.78)** (3.47)** (3.73)** (0.26)
Tenure (years) −0.001 −0.001 −0.003 −0.000
(74.23)** (5.90)** (67.76)** (4.71)**
Calendar time dummies (for each quarter) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age dummies (for each year) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interaction of tenure with No Yes No No
age and calendar time dummies
Note: Marginal effects, absolute value of robust z statistics in parentheses, clustered at the
individual level
* Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
out that outflow effects show up predominantly longer unemployment spells
when benefits are extended to 52 weeks. While the remaining coefficients show
the expected negative sign, they turn out statistically insignificant. In contrast,
unemployment inflow effects are somewhat stronger for workers with low
tenure and become insignificant for long-tenure workers eligible to 39 benefit
weeks. In sum, while we find differential impacts of workers with different
durations in their current state, the basic picture of Table 2 remains. In general
inflow effects seem to be stronger than outflow effects.
As a further test for the robustness of our results, we look at the effects
of the change in maximum benefit duration once we split our sample into
various subgroups (Table 4). All regressions are based on the specification
we used in Table 2, column 2 (outflow) and column 4 (inflow). The basic
message of Table 4 is that increasing the maximum benefit duration both from
30 to 52 weeks and from 30 to 39 weeks has a significant and quantitatively
important impact on the unemployment inflow. In contrast, the unemploy-
ment outflow coefficients are less important and the point estimates mostly
insignificant.
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6 Benefit duration and equilibrium unemployment
Using the parameter estimates of the inflow and outflow probabilities we
consider how the maximum benefit duration affects equilibrium unemploy-
ment. Our thought experiment is the following. Let us take our estimates
of the increase in PBD at face value and consider a steady-state situation
in which the inflow into and the outflow from unemployment are identical.
Which unemployment rate is implied by the system before the policy change
as compared to the system after the change. Ignoring effects of personal
characteristics x we have
u∗(T) = θˆe(T)
θˆe(T) + θˆu(T)
(4)
The policy changes we are analyzing are discrete, and amount to a substantial
increase in maximum benefit duration for the concerned groups. In order to
assess the effect of the change in benefit duration on equilibrium unemploy-
ment, we perform a comparative static analysis. If T1 and T2 are the maximum
benefit durations before and after the policy change, the change in equilibrium
unemployment equals
u∗ = u∗(T2) − u∗(T1) (5)
Furthermore, it is straightforward to decompose this change into (i) a change
due to a lower outflow from unemployment, (ii) a change due to a higher
inflow into unemployment, and (iii) to an interaction effect involving higher-
order terms
u∗ = u∗(out) + u∗(in) + interaction effect
where the inflow- and outflow-effects are given by
u∗(out) = θˆe(T1)
θˆe(T1) + θˆu(T2)
− θˆe(T1)
θˆe(T1) + θˆu(T1)
u∗(in) = θˆe(T2)
θˆe(T2) + θˆu(T1)
− θˆe(T1)
θˆe(T1) + θˆu(T1)
Notice that, just like in any other decomposition analysis there is an “in-
teraction effect” (or unexplained residual). When we calculate u∗(out), we
change the outflow rate from the pre-policy level θˆu(T1) to the post-policy level
θˆu(T2), keeping the inflow rate θˆe(T1) at its pre-policy level. Similarly, u∗(in)
calculates the hypothetical effect on equilibrium unemployment of an isolated
change in the inflow rate keeping the outflow rate at its pre-policy level. Since
equilibrium unemployment is non-linearly related to inflow and outflow rates,
u∗(in) and u∗(out) do not sum up to u∗. The residual is captured by the
interaction effect.
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Table 5 Effects of PBD increase in inflow, outflow and unemployment population ratio
Quarterly Quarterly Interaction Implied steady-state
outflow inflow unemployment ratio
(%)
PBD change 30 to 52 weeks
Before policy-change .4012 .0098 2.38
After policy-change .3680 .0142 3.72
Implied increase in u* (p.p.) .21 1.04 .09 1.34
(percentage due to ...) (15.6%) (77.8%) (6.6%) (100.0%)
Implied increase in u* per 0.010 0.047 0.004 0.061
additional PBD week (p.p.)
PBD change 30 to 39 weeks
Before policy-change .4649 .0098 2.07
After policy-change .4491 .0121 2.62
Implied increase in u* (p.p.) .07 .46 .02 .55
(percentage due to ...) (13.1%) (84.1%) (2.8%) (100.0%)
Implied increase in u* per 0.008 0.051 0.002 0.061
additional PBD week
Note: Calculated from Table 2
We are now ready to present our simulation results that show how the more
generous potential benefit duration affects the steady-state unemployment
rate (Table 5). We proceed as follows. To get the effect of the benefit duration
increase from 30 to 52 weeks, we utilize the entire sample (all age groups,
both before- and after-policy sample). Using our regression results of Table 2
(columns 2 and 4), we estimate, for each observation, the inflow- and outflow-
probability with and without benefit duration extended to 52 weeks. With
these estimates, we can calculate the implied steady-state unemployment rate
with and without extended benefit duration. Moreover, using these estimates
we can decompose the estimated increase in the steady-state unemployment
rate into an inflow- and an outflow-component applying the procedure de-
scribed. For the PBD extension from 30 to 39 weeks, we proceed in an
analogous way.
Table 5 reports the result from this simulation exercise. In the upper panel
of Table 5 we show the effects of the PBD extension from 30 to 52 weeks.
The exit rate from unemployment (first column) falls from 0.4012 before
the policy change and to 0.3680 after the change, implying a 8.3 percent
reduction in the unemployment outflow probability.17 Similarly, the entry rate
into unemployment (second column) increases from 0.0098 to 0.0142, which
amounts to a 44.9% increase in the unemployment inflow probability. Taken
together, these estimates imply an increase in the steady-state unemployment-
population ratio from 2.38% before the policy change to 3.72% after the policy
17Note that this result is very much in line with our earlier results on the effects of PBD extensions
in Austria (Lalive et al. 2006) suggesting that extending PBD from 30 to 52 weeks increases
unemployment duration by 2.27 weeks which is about 12% of average unemployment duration.
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change.18 In other words, the unemployment rate increases by 1.34 percentage
points or by about 56%.
The lower panel of Table 5 applies the same procedure the estimate the
effects of the PBD extension from 30 to 39 weeks. While qualitatively all effects
go in the same direction they are quantitatively much smaller. The outflow
probability decreases from .4649 to .4491 (a 3.4% reduction); and the inflow
probability increases from 0.0098 to 0.0121 (an 23.5% increase).19 These effects
imply an increase in the equilibrium unemployment population ratio of 0.55
percentage points (or 26.6%), from 2.07% before the change to 2.62% after
the change.
Table 5 shows a further interesting result. Decomposing the increase in the
unemployment ratio into an inflow- and an outflow-component reveals that
the bulk of the increase is due to the larger unemployment inflow rate. The
effect of extended PBD on the unemployment outflow is much smaller. For
the PBD increase to 52 weeks, 77.8% of the increase in the unemployment
ratio can be attributed to an increase in the entry rate, whereas only 15.6% is
due to a lower exit rate from unemployment. For the PBD increase from 30
to 39 weeks, an even larger fraction of the increase in the unemployment ratio
(84.1%) is due to the increase in the inflow-rate, whereas only 13.1% can be
assigned to the lower unemployment exit probability.
A further interesting indicator shows that the increase in PBD raises the
unemployment ratio by 0.061 percentage points per additional PBD week for
the extension from 30 to 52 weeks; and by 0.061 percentage points for the
extension from 30 to 39 weeks. Interestingly, for both policy changes, the
estimated effect per additional PBD week attributable to the unemployment
inflow, is similar for the short (30 to 39) and the long (30 to 52) PBD increase.
The isolated effect of one additional PBD week on the unemployment inflow
indicates an increase in the unemployment ratio by 0.047 percentage points
(increase from 30 to 52 weeks) and by 0.051 percentage points (increase
from 30 to 39 weeks). The effects on the unemployment outflow are much
smaller. We find that one additional PBD-week increases the equilibrium
unemployment ratio by 0.010 percentage points for the policy change from
30 to 52 weeks, whereas the corresponding estimate for the policy change from
30 to 39 weeks amounts to only 0.008 percentage points.
6.1 Simulations for subgroups
We find that the increase in maximum benefit duration increases equilibrium
unemployment, to some extent because the outflow from unemployment goes
18As indicated before, our sample contains attached workers for which the unemployment rate is
rather low. For example, in the third quarter of 1988 the average unemployment rate in our sample
was 2.04%.
19Note that the outflow result is, again, very much in line with our earlier result for Austria (Lalive
et al. 2006) suggesting that extending PBD from 30 to 39 weeks increases unemployment duration
by 0.45 weeks which is about 2% of average unemployment duration.
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Table 6 Decomposing the increase in the unemployment population ratio, various subsamples
Subsample u Change Due to outflow Due to inflow Due to interaction
in u Absolute % Absolute % Absolute %
PBD 30 to 52
Full sample 0.0238 0.0134 0.0021 15.6% 0.0104 77.8% 0.0009 6.6%
Females 0.0293 0.0198 0.0019 9.5% 0.0169 85.3% 0.0010 5.2%
Males 0.0202 0.0062 −0.0006 −8.9% 0.0069 111.8% −0.0002 −3.0%
Blue collar 0.0234 0.0138 0.0002 1.7% 0.0135 97.4% 0.0001 0.9%
White collar 0.0196 0.0111 −0.0010 −9.2% 0.0128 115.1% −0.0006 −5.8%
Low wage 0.0351 0.0170 0.0009 5.4% 0.0157 92.3% 0.0004 2.3%
High wage 0.0168 0.0076 0.0001 0.8% 0.0075 98.9% 0.0000 0.3%
PBD 30 to 39
Full sample 0.0207 0.0055 0.0007 13.1% 0.0046 84.1% 0.0002 2.8%
Females 0.0218 0.0034 −0.0003 −10.0% 0.0038 111.8% −0.0001 −1.7%
Males 0.0186 0.0044 −0.0006 −14.2% 0.0052 118.1% −0.0002 −3.9%
Blue collar 0.0210 0.0061 −0.0004 −6.0% 0.0066 107.9% −0.0001 −1.8%
White collar 0.0171 0.0025 −0.0004 −17.8% 0.0030 120.9% −0.0001 −3.1%
Low wage 0.0304 0.0050 −0.0009 −18.5% 0.0061 122.0% −0.0002 −3.6%
High wage 0.0148 0.0036 0.0005 13.6% 0.0030 83.6% 0.0001 2.7%
Note: Calculated from Table 4
down but mainly through an increase in the inflow into unemployment. To
investigate whether this results also holds for subgroups we use the parameter
estimates presented in Table 4 to perform similar simulations as before, but
now separately for each subgroup. Table 6 presents the simulation results. The
upper part presents the results for the PBD change from 30 to 52 weeks, the
lower part gives the simulation results for the PBD change from 30 to 39 weeks.
For reasons of comparison the first rows of each part of the table replicates the
main results of Table 5.20
As shown the PBD change from 30 to 52 weeks increases equilibrium
unemployment for every subgroup with the increase for women, low wage
workers and non-seasonal workers being larger than for their counterparts.
There is hardly any difference between blue collar and white collar workers
and between workers with low tenure and high tenure. For every subgroup
the contribution to the change in equilibrium unemployment of the change in
inflow is larger than that of the change in outflow.
Also for the PBD change from 30 to 39 weeks we find that the increase
in equilibrium unemployment is mostly due to the increase in the inflow into
unemployment and to a much smaller extent due to the decrease in the outflow
from unemployment.
20Note that in the simulations we use all estimated parameters of Table 6 irrespective of whether
or not they are significantly different from zero at conventional levels of significance.
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7 Conclusion
According to job search theory an increase in the maximum unemployment
benefit duration affects the unemployment rate both through a decrease
in the outflow from unemployment and through an increase in the inflow
to unemployment. These theoretical predictions are confirmed by empirical
research. However, empirical research has been on either the outflow from
unemployment or the inflow into unemployment. There are no studies that
investigate both effects simultaneously. So, it is not clear to what extent effects
on inflow and outflow affect the unemployment rate.
This paper uses microdata to evaluate the impact of an increase in max-
imum benefit duration on the steady-state unemployment rate distinguishing
between these two effects. We draw on policy changes in Austria that extended
maximum benefit duration from 30 to 52 (30 to 39) weeks for individuals
above age 50 (between ages 40 and 49) with a continuous work history.
We find that this policy change lead to 56% increase in the steady-state
unemployment rate for the older age group and a 26% increase in the steady-
state unemployment rate for the younger age group. Surprisingly, most of
the increase in equilibrium unemployment is due to an increase in the inflow
into unemployment, whereas the effect of the decrease in the outflow from
unemployment is modest. We also find that the effects are stronger for women
than for men. There may be institutional reasons for this as conditional on age
women are closer to (early) retirement, and it is in line with the general notion
that women react more strongly to incentives—wage elasticities of labor supply
are larger for women than for men. Otherwise our results are rather robust
across population subgroups.
In Lalive et al. (2006) we showed that the increase in PBD reduced the
outflow from unemployment a lot. The PBD extension made it a lot more
attractive for unemployed workers to reduce the search activities and thus
lower their job finding rate. The novel findings in this paper are twofold. First,
the extension of the PBD also increases the inflow into unemployment. The
PBD extension made it only a little bit more attractive for employed workers to
become unemployed. Our second finding is that the effect on the equilibrium
unemployment rate due to increase in the inflow into unemployment is more
important than the effect due to the decrease in the outflow from unemploy-
ment. Although the PBD extension makes it only a little bit more attractive
for employed workers to become unemployed, there are many more employed
workers than unemployed workers. It is the sheer mass of employed workers
that cause the inflow effect to be larger.
From a policy point of view it is important to know that the inflow effect
is larger than the outflow effect. Should this not be taken into account the
effects of a change in PBD will be seriously underestimated. The fact that
changes in PBD have quite a large—aggregate—inflow effect also means that
PBD could be an instrument to increase the employment rate. If the PBD
1408 R. Lalive et al.
is shortened, firms may become more reluctant to destroy jobs and it may
also be less attractive for workers to “quit” into unemployment. We also
note that our results are partly based on older (50+) workers which have low
employment rates in many countries. Taking into account inflow effects for
these groups seems highly relevant from a policy perspective. With respect
to 50+ workers, it should be emphasized that our analysis has focused on
flows between employment and unemployment only. However, often older
workers who lost their job might consider to enter other programs (such as
disability and early retirement) and changing unemployment insurance rules
may affect flows into other programs. While this issue is beyond the scope of
the present paper, future research should consider how changing incentives in
one program may affect flows in and out of other programs.
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